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Canadian narratives of the Great War rarely give a very clear picture of the enemy. They 
may mention German regiments, brigades, 
divisions or corps that opposed Canadian troops 
on this or that front, but detailed citations from 
German sources are often missing. There are 
a number of reasons for this, most notably the 
scarcity of translated primary documents. A 
number of comprehensive regimental histories 
were published in Germany during the interwar 
years, but these are often difficult to obtain and 
tend to be printed in old German. Consequently, 
we were glad to receive this translation of 
Generalleutnant Alfred Dieterich’s report on his 
brigade’s defensive operations on Vimy Ridge 
during March-April 1917. Dieterich originally 
published the account in Germany after the 
war, and to our knowledge, this is the first time 
it has appeared in English. The translation was 
completed by Christopher and Ute Wilde Linnell.
In 1917 Dieterich served as the commanding 
officer of the 79th Reserve Infantry Brigade, 
the sole infantry brigade of the 79th Reserve 
Infantry Division, one of nine second series ‘New-
Formation Reserve Divisions’ created during 
the winter of 1914-15.1 Its three regiments of 
infantry, numbered consecutively from 261 to 
263, largely comprised Prussian recruits. In 
February 1915 the division was deployed in East 
Prussia and fought at the Battle of the Masurian 
Lakes. The 79th remained on the Eastern Front 
until November 1916, when it was relieved and 
transferred to the west. After a period of rest, the 
division moved into the line on the la Bassée front 
in early 1917, and was then redeployed further 
south in the Vimy sector at the end of February. 
The division was badly damaged at Vimy on 9 
April, losing 1,660 men captured. Five days later 
the remnants were relieved and sent to a quiet 
sector of the front where the division remained 
until the summer of 1917.2
In contrast with their British counterparts, 
many German divisions by 1917 comprised just 
one infantry brigade, along with a field artillery 
regiment and a selection of ancillary divisional 
troops. The German infantry brigade usually 
consisted of three regiments, each of three 
battalions. The meant that a German regiment 
roughly equalled a British brigade. Therefore a 
single German infantry brigade was about the 
same size as three British brigades. 
In April 1917 the three infantry regiments of 
79th Reserve Division were deployed against 
the northern-central portion of the Canadian 
front at Vimy Ridge, opposite the 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th Canadian Infantry Divisions. On the 
79th Reserve Division’s left flank, just north of 
Thélus, was the 263rd Reserve Infantry Regiment 
(Section ‘Arnulf ’). Next in line was the 262nd 
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(Section ‘Zollern’), and on the right was the 261st 
Regiment (Section ‘Fischer’). 
Generalleutnant Dieterich begins his story with 
a summary of key strategic developments on the 
Western Front in early 1917, including the German 
with-drawals to the 
Hindenburg Line 
and the offensive 
plans of General 
Robert Nivelle, the 
new French Com-
mander-in-Chief who 
had recently replaced 
Genera l  Joseph 
Joffre. According 
to Dieterich, the 
German high com-
m a n d  e x p e c t e d 
additional attacks in 
the wake of Nivelle’s 
initial thrusts, and 
the men of the 79th 
Reserve Division 
worked quickly to 
repair the relatively 
shallow defences 
atop the Vimy Ridge. 
He offers a graphic account of 4th Canadian 
Division’s failed gas raid on 1 March,3 and then 
turns to the terrible destruction unleashed by 
Allied artillery fire during the two weeks leading 
up to the 9 April attack. Finally, Dieterich recounts 
the ebb and flow of the four-day battle between 
his troops and the Canadian Corps, focussing 
on the inability of German counterattacks to 
dislodge the enemy from newly won positions 
along the ridge. 
Dieterich’s romantic language is typical of 
German regimental histories. He is careful to 
emphasize that his troops fought bravely against 
the steepest odds, and is especially bold in his 
descriptions of noble struggles down to the last 
cartridge and hand grenade. In several instances, 
he names individual junior officers who sacrificed 
themselves in last ditch attempts to stem the 
Canadian tide. At the same time, a certain 
degree of detachment is evident in the narrative. 
Dieterich could not have personally witnessed 
much of what he describes. The combat narrative 
is clearly organized according to each regiment, 
so Dieterich likely based his account on reports 
completed by surviving regimental and company 
officers or NCOs. Dieterich is careful to absolve 
his brigade of responsibility for the defeat, but 
neither is the account totally unrealistic in its 
assessment of the battle’s outcome. Under the 
weight of heavy artillery fire and strong infantry 
attacks, the relatively 
s h a l l o w  b e l t  o f 
defences atop the 
ridge could not hold 
out indefinitely, and 
once the Germans 
were pushed onto 
the reverse slope 
facing the wide open 
Douai plain, there 
was l i t t le option 
but to withdraw to 
a more secure line. 
In common with 
his Canadian op-
ponents, although 
perhaps to a lesser 
degree, Dieterich 
managed to salvage 
something useful 
from a battle that 
cost his division in excess of 1,600 men captured. 
As he states in his closing paragraph:
The fierce battle over Vimy Ridge was fought to a 
standstill. In the aftermath of this engagement, it 
was a high honour for any German soldier to be 
able to call himself a Vimy veteran…In the hearts 
of the soldiers and their loved ones thrives the 
memory of those heroic days and deep sorrow of 
loss at Vimy Ridge, that patch of earth sanctified 
by the rivers of noble blood and glorious graves. 
Notes
1. Handbook of the German Army in War, January 1917 
(Menston: EP Publishing, 1973), p.28.
2. Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American 
Expeditionary Forces, Chaumont, Histories of the Two 
Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army 
Which Participated in the War (1914-1918) (Washington: 
United States War Office, 1920), pp.537-539. 
3. For more on the raid see Tim Cook, “A Proper Slaughter: 
The March 1917 Gas Raid at Vimy Ridge,” Canadian 
Military History, Volume 8, Number 2, Spring 1999, 
pp.7-23.
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1917 Order of Battle
79th Reserve Infantry Division
79th Reserve Infantry Brigade
261st Reserve Infantry Regiment
262nd Reserve Infantry Regiment
263rd Reserve Infantry Regiment
3rd Squadron, 16th Hussar Regiment (cavalry)
63rd Reserve Field Artillery Regiment
(nine batteries)
379th Pioneer Battalion
(engineers, searchlight sections, trench mortars)
541st Ambulance Company
(three field hospitals and one veterinary hospital)
746th Motor Transport Column
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The General Position
of the German Western Front
In Spring 1917, the German Army High Command, anticipating the forthcoming 
French and English General Offensive, decided 
to save on Reserves by shortening their Western 
Front line from the protruding Bulge of Arras-
Roye-Soissons into a newly-built front line, the 
“Siegfried Stellung” (Hindenburg line), and at 
the same time devastate the area between the 
old and new lines. This would take the ground 
away from the forthcoming French and English 
general offensive, as well as enabling, at the same 
time, a strong reserve to be separated and created 
through the considerable shortening of the front 
lines. So in the middle of March when the French 
and English were ready to launch their long 
prepared attack against the Bulge, they found 
to their surprise the German front had slipped 
away and had been pulled back behind a wildly 
devastated area, which for the next while ruled 
out any further offensives.
In their Operations plans, the German High 
Command had to reckon that the Allies, after the 
failure of the first General Offensive, would direct 
further offensives against the flanks adjoining the 
Front to the north and south of the devastated 
area, and thereby try to lift the strong Hindenburg 
Line off its hinges at its wings. 
North of the Hindenburg Line lay the key point 
in the German front line at Vimy Ridge (a ridge 
that, in the north was often steep and in the south 
gently sloped eastwards). The German front line 
ran west of the towns of Givenchy, Vimy and 
Farbus. In the possession of the enemy, it would 
offer a wide view east to the Douai plain. This 
important ridge could only be defended by highly 
reliable troops during the forthcoming General 
Offensive. It was entrusted to the 79th Reserve 
Division.
Deployment of the 79th Reserve 
Division into the Vimy Position
The Division had arrived from the Eastern Front at the beginning of December 1916, 
after the conclusion of long and glorious battles. 
They had just gone through several weeks of 
training near Lille, under the leadership of the 
General of the Infantry von Bacmeister, and had 
learned to master the peculiarities of the battle 
tactics of the Western Front. Now they were 
awaiting deployment near la Bassée and Lens. 
Since the end of February 1917, they had been 
stationed between Givenchy and Thélus in the 
cratered terrain of Vimy Ridge and were trying 
hard to reinforce the shot-up and collapsed 
trenches for the expected battle.
Dieterich’s Account:
Canadians survey the landscape around a captured 
German emplacement near the village of Thélus, April 
1917. 
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The right wing of the Division, “Section Fischer” 
was over three kilometres wide and had the 
Reserve Infantry Regiment (Res. Inf. Regt.) 261 
(Colonel-Lieutenant von Goerne). The middle 
“Section Zollern,” was for the Res. Inf. Regt. 262 
(Major Baron von Rotenhan) and the left wing, 
“Section Arnulf,” entrusted to the Res. Inf. Regt. 
263 (Colonel-Lieutenant von Behr).
In each Regiment two Battalions were deployed 
for battle, and one Battalion kept back for the 
use of the higher commanders. 
The difficulty for the defence was the shallow 
depth of the position of only 700-1000 metres. 
If the attacker was able to push the defender 
off the small ridge in their first onslaught, then 
the re-capture by a counterattack was unlikely. 
On top of the ridge the first position had three 
insufficiently planned lines whose shelters, which 
mostly lay mistakenly in the first line, could not 
withstand any heavy calibre bombardment. The 
second position was out of the question for a 
longer defence, due to its unfavourable position 
at the foot of the eastern slope.
The batteries of the Division Artillery commander, 
Colonel Bleidorn, found covered positions out 
of sight to the east of the strung out ridge. The 
close range artillery, the 63rd Reserve Field 
Artillery Regiment, and the 2nd section of the 
69th Field Artillery Regiment under Major Cropp, 
was divided according to the Infantry Regiment 
Sections into three sub-groups of four field 
batteries each. Subgroup Arnulf was further 
strengthened by one piece Field-H Battery. With it 
came several dug-in close range pieces of artillery 
supporting the position of the 1st infantry. The 
long-range artillery of Major Kemmer was divided 
into 2 subgroups consisting of 9 batteries: 3 
pieces of Field-H, 4 mortars, and 2 pieces of 
direct fire batteries. Observation points were 
offered to all batteries on the Vimy Ridge, but 
the space was crowded and therefore often under 
heavy fire.
Work was necessary to build the position into 
a condition capable for defending against the 
expected attack; this strained all parts of the 
Division to the limit, including the resting troops 
and the medical formations. In spite of the enemy’s 
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lively harassing fire, constant work continued 
on the re-enforcement of the position, on the 
renovation of the shot-up trenches, the building 
of new gallery-tunnels and re-enforcement of 
wire obstacles. Convoy roads for the nightly 
deliveries of Reserves needed to be established, 
the Regiment and Battalion command posts had 
to be supplied with aircraft signalling sheets that 
had to be laid out on the approach of German 
ground attack aircraft to show them where they 
had to drop orders or reports. Because the 
deployment of the Division shifted the borders 
of the Sections, new Command Posts had to be 
built for the 261st Regiment’s staff at the Forgery 
north of Vimy, for the 262nd Regiment’s staff in 
the trench of the 2nd position, and for the 263rd 
Regiment’s staff on the east slope of Vimy Ridge. 
Staff of the Artillery Combat Group joined the 
Infantry Regiment Staff. One Brigade Command 
Post1  was placed at the road junction east of 
Vimy as well for the long-range Artillery Combat 
Group nearby.
Deployed to the left and next to the 79th Reserve 
Division, between Thélus and the Scarpe, were 
the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division and the 14th 
Bavarian Infantry Division. These two divisions, 
along with the 79th Reserve Division, formed 
Group Vimy, part of the 1st Bavarian Corps 
under General of the Infantry von Fassbender. 
The Division of Group Arras (IX Reserve Corps) 
joined south of the Scarpe and over the ridge 
terrain of Wancourt and Queant. To the right of 
the 79th Reserve Division, in the ruins of Angres 
and Givenchy, the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division 
of the Group Souchez (VIII Reserve Corps) was 
awaiting the attack.
Behind those Groups and subordinate to the 
Army High Command, were several Divisions 
in Reserve, in the area east of Douai-Cambrai, a 
total of nine divisions by 9 April.
Canadian Advance on 1 March 1917
The 79th Reserve Division had hardly settled in their new position when on 1 March an 
attempt was made to gain the Vimy Ridge through 
a surprise advance of strong forces from the 
opposing Canadian Divisions. The goal of the 
assault was aimed against the northern part of 
the Ridge, which being hardly 700 meters deep, 
was the fastest to be broken through. A short 
but overwhelming Artillery barrage tried to force 
down the defenders in the front trenches and also 
targetted the batteries in and around Vimy which 
were soon enveloped in poisonous clouds of gas. 
Especially heavy was the fire of the attacker in 
the district north of Vimy where in a short time 
3 guns of a battery of the 63rd Reserve Field 
Artillery Regiment were destroyed.
At 0400 hours artificial fog spread over the battle 
lines of the defender. At the same time dense 
masses of Canadians rose out of their stand-to 
positions. Wave after wave broke against the 
German positions focussed on the trenches of 
the 261st Regiment, but also overlapping on 
the right onto the section of the 16th Bavarian 
Rifle Infantry Division and left onto the 262nd 
Regiment. Flares went up everywhere and a 
counter-barrage was fired by our guns. They 
fought with the utmost strain as far as they 
were still fit for action, but they did not have the 
strength to dam the storm of the attacker. But 
the rifles and machine guns in the front trenches 
and shell-holes were tensed and on the lookout. 
The ones that deserve the honour of the day 
before all others were the 2nd, 4th, 9th, and 11th 
Companies of the 261st. Their fire mowed down 
the dense masses of the storming Canadians.
The attack broke down in front of the wire. A 
repeat attack at 0600 hours met the same fate. 
Only on the right, at the Bavarian position did 
the Canadians force an entry. But a powerful 
counterattack by sections of the 1st Battalion 
261st quickly restored the situation. The enemy 
gave up further attacks. He had bitten on iron 
and knew who his opponent was. Hundreds of 
Canadians lay dead in no-man’s-land. But the 
defender had to mourn a good many dead and 
many wounded as well. In this battle, the first 
officer of the Division on the Western Front, 
Lieutenant Lieser of the 261st Regiment, found 
his heroic death.
Two days after this battle the Canadians asked for 
a ceasefire to remove their dead. It was granted 
chivalrously by the German commanders. The 
3rd and 4th of March witnessed a sight perhaps 
never before seen in the World War, how, after a 
hard fought battle, the comrades, undisturbed 
by the foe, carried their dead on stretchers 
from the battlefield to bury them behind their 
lines – an occurrence among many others which 
shows how the German warrior has preserved 
5
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sympathy and a sense of chivalry in the horrors 
of the World War.
On 5 March the battle activity started again. 
With the clearing weather one could see far into 
the enemy rear from the crest of Vimy Ridge. 
The Arras-Souchez road stretching parallel to 
the front, the Loretto Ridge and the ruins of the 
villages Souchez, Carency & Neuville-St. Vaast 
were clearly recognisable. Soon the weather 
turned again. After mild spring weather, it turned 
cold. Drifting snow alternated with pouring rain 
so that trenches and craters filled with water.
Preparatory Artillery Battle
Since the end of March the English were massing divisions of their 3rd and 4th Armies 
opposite the German 6th Army on both sides 
of Arras. The main focus of their attack shifted 
to their left wing, which would break through 
between Souchez and Quéant over the steep edge 
of Vimy and along the banks of the rivers Scarpe 
and Cambrai – with the distant destination of 
Mons. At the same time they were opening fire 
with thousands of artillery pieces and mortars 
onto the German front lines, and supported by the 
destructive fire of numerous bomber squadrons. 
This soon put the fire of the Somme battle far 
into the shade.2 To a great extent this destroyed 
the positions north and south of the Scarpe and 
enveloped the German batteries and sometimes 
also the infantry positions in poisonous gas 
clouds. The ridge between Givenchy and Farbus 
was exposed to the heaviest fire. In the first days 
of the artillery battle, it was roughly possible to 
ascertain the strength of the English artillery fire 
(the number of shells descending on the 79th 
Reserve Division was between 12-15,000) the 
counting was later impossible after the fire was 
reinforced. The main strength of the fire on this 
Division was at first aimed at Section Fischer, but 
the barrage was later concentrated with greater 
force on Section Arnulf.
Since the end of March even villages and 
roads located far to the rear were suffering 
under English artillery fire. The inhabitants of 
threatened villages were moved to the rear after 
several French citizens lost their lives through 
this. The observation balloon anchorage near 
Acheville also was often the target of English 
artillery fire.
Since the beginning of April, there existed no 
more possibility of repairing destruction caused 
by the bombardment. Through the effect of heavy 
artillery in concert with the predominantly wet 
weather, the positions were soon transformed 
into a crater-field of thick mud, in which only a 
few shelters escaped destruction. Only a small 
amount of munitions, material or rations moved 
up to the front, taking the strength of one man 
for one night. Enormous difficulties also arose 
under these circumstances for the supply of 
the artillery ammunition. The 8-horse ‘Protzen’ 
artillery transport wagon with mounted Protz-
case to hold necessary munitions could not get 
through. The heavy shells had to be dragged 
forward a great distance by manpower. In spite 
of this, not only were the daily needs supplied 
(and some days the artillery of the Division used 
up to 2,000 rounds) but also enough munitions 
for the defence of the coming major attack was 
stored at the firing positions. Although the 
constantly shot up long distance telephone lines 
were supplemented by radio and light signal 
posts (even the cables buried two metres deep 
were constantly destroyed from hits) the firing 
effect of our artillery was constantly interrupted 
through the destruction of the Battery Posts and 
connections.
The numerically superior strength of the English 
fighter squadrons was also felt, but if they 
attacked our fighter pilots, especially the well-
known red triplane of Baron von Richthofen, they 
always retreated in tatters and lost 50 aircraft 
shot down in the last eight days before the big 
attack.
Every night the soldiers of both sides were kept 
in suspense through raiding operations, which 
brought the 79th Reserve Division the odd bit of 
important news about the enemy, while similar 
attempts by the enemy were repelled.
Underground, the war also surged to and fro. 
German sharpshooters immediately occupied 
mine craters that were blasted by German 
miners.
The losses of soldiers and material visibly 
multiplied at the beginning of April. Immediately 
before Easter, it was possible for the first time to 
deploy the fighting strength of the 79th Reserve 
Division battalions into a solid position in the 
front. The following situation was generally the 
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case: in the 1st and 2nd lines there were 1 to 2 
companies, and 1 to 2 companies behind that as 
a security force for the 3rd line, the rest stayed in 
reserve for the battalion commander. The trench 
strength of the companies varied between 50 and 
90 riflemen. This shrunk considerably before the 
beginning of the big attack. Since the battalion 
reserves had shrunk down to a few groups 
because of Messenger posts, the Division had a 
company move forward into the battle zone from 
each reserve battalion immediately before the 
major battle, where they stayed with the Infantry 
Pioneer Companies as a weak reserve for the 
regiment. At the end of March, six machine guns 
of Machine-Gun Section 20 were deployed, and 
with the other machine guns hidden deeply in 
the cratered landscape. In conjunction with the 
few still operable mortars, they formed the solid 
skeleton of the very thinly manned positions.
The superior strength of the attackers in material 
was overpowering. From English reports it 
is possible to gather that they were firing 
140 artillery pieces and 50 mortars on every 
kilometer of the attack front north of the Scarpe. 
This reveals that the 79th Reserve Division 
was exposed to the effect of over 400 artillery 
pieces and 150 mortars, for which they could 
only counter with 89 artillery pieces and few 
mortars, many of which were destroyed during 
the artillery battle by the superior strength of 
the enemy fire. No wonder that our soldiers in 
the firing trenches had the experience that they 
were without protection and at the mercy of the 
enemy’s destructive fire.
It became increasingly difficult with the all-
destroying enemy fire to bring supplies to the 
forward lines. The soldiers could often only rely 
on bread and water, which they scooped out of the 
gas- and feces-contaminated shell holes. There 
also occurred, wherever there was mining activity 
under the ground, the nerve shattering feeling of 
standing on unstable ground. Thus the strength 
and morale of the troops visibly declined.
On 6 April the 6th Army High Command received 
the order, from the Army Group Crown Prince 
Rupprecht, to draw the divisions destined for 
the first relief of the Front Divisions closer to 
the threatened stretch Angres-Wancourt. The 
march to the front of these divisions, however, 
were delayed in such a manner that on 9 April 
they were not yet in position to be able to launch 
a counterattack.
On 7 April the enemy artillery fire eased off 
noticeably, although on the afternoon of the 8th 
(Easter Sunday) it swelled again into a heavy 
barrage, which carried on throughout the night 
with varying strength. It was the warm up.
British gunfire falls on Vimy Ridge, April 1917.
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General Attack and Deep 
Breakthrough South of Thélus
At 0530 hours on the morning of 9 April, in the damp, cold and gray pre-dawn light, 
a hailstorm of iron such as nobody had ever 
experienced fell on the German positions. Its 
racket equalled the roaring and raging of a 
hurricane-lashed sea. Everywhere rose huge 
fountains of earth. The ground seemed to shake. 
While the forward lines were hit predominantly by 
light artillery and mortars, supported by machine 
gun fire, the rear lines and artillery batteries 
were hit with medium, heavy and super heavy 
fire and covered with gas. The thick smoke over 
the German lines grew to dark clouds, which 
radiated like red embers. Shallow fire flew far 
over the roads where approaching Reserves 
were expected. Yellow flares rose on all parts of 
the German front. Though before all of the gun 
batteries could launch their barrage, the iron hail 
on the forward lines lessened and with increased 
strength leaps heaved onto deeper targets. Even 
the machine gun bursts which had been combing 
the most forward German breastworks had lifted. 
On many parts of the front the ground opened up 
with a crash as a result of underground mines.
Simultaneously, while icy wind and snowstorm 
hit the churned up fields, the rested, excellently 
fed and clothed English Attack Divisions rose 
out of their trenches and craters, to storm the 
German positions. In the front were grenadiers 
armed with pistols; behind them in ever new 
thick waves, riflemen with their weapons 
hanging, a large spade in hand. Where, through 
the preparatory barrage and exploding mines all 
resistance was extinguished, the German lines 
were quickly flooded. But, where German guns 
and machine guns were still firing the attack 
was stopped, and the dead piled high. Where 
ammunition and grenades ran out or muddy 
machine guns gave up the job, they fought with 
bayonets.
Between Thélus and Wancourt masses of 
tanks rolled forward over the numerous roads 
branching out from Arras and the German first 
A Canadian soldier takes a breather (left) as two officers examine a captured German M1913 15 cm (5.9-inch) ‘long 
howitzer’ in a well-constructed concrete emplacement. The cylindrical wicker baskets strewn about at left were  protective 
shipping containers for artillery rounds.
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and second lines were taken on the Arras-Douai 
road and also in part of the third line in the 
Scarpe valley. Across from Arras an almost totally 
exposed 12-kilometre-wide gap developed quite 
early which gradually was closed in a makeshift 
fashion by the storming Reserves moving to the 
neighbouring unscathed sections. The arrival of 
the reserve divisions from the rear could not be 
counted on before 10 April.
Battle for Vimy Ridge
North of Thélus, the English attack roared with its strongest might. While on Vimy 
Ridge the regiments of the 79th Reserve Division 
awaited the attack in tense anticipation. Deployed 
against us were four of the best English attack 
divisions – the Canadians.
On the left wing of the Division in the forward 
trenches of the 268th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 
with their machine guns destroyed, only a 
few were fighting fit. They were overwhelmed 
in a hand-grenade battle only after stubborn 
resistance. Standing high up on the breastwork 
of his trench, Lieutenant Runge, the leader of 
11th Company fell in close combat with many 
other comrades. There was persistant resistance 
in the 2nd line. The fire of the 12th Company 
and from parts of the 10th Company brought 
the assault of the Canadians to a stop; and from 
the rear charged the reserve platoon of the 10th 
Company under Vice-Sergeant Borcherding from 
the ‘Felsenkeller’ through the craters towards 
the front, in order to strengthen the resistance 
of the comrades. South of les Tilleuls the deep 
breakthrough of the English was gradually 
successful, it also had its effect on Section Arnulf. 
Dense masses of English advanced along the 
Arras-Lens road, pressed forward against the 
flanks and rear of the 263rd, rolled over them 
from the south and encircled them at the rear. 
There were heaps of dead and injured in the 
German ranks. At the head of the 4th and 10th 
Companies respectively, Lieutenants Patscheck 
and Korb fell in brave resistance. Also the 
enthusiastic Lieutenant Zipp who sped to the 
front from his intermediate position with his 
machine gun was hit by a deadly shot. In his 
vicinity Lieutenant Hitzschke found his heroic 
death as he sought to dam the enemy break-in 
with his mortar. Death had a rich harvest. The 
first position became impossible to hold. With it 
went the stretched intermediate position of the 
Regiment from Thélus to Vimy. There, the close 
support artillery fired 20 minutes more, and 
then fell silent. None of the gunners returned to 
their firing. In the last hour, the leader of the 1st 
Battalion, Major Meyer, was still able to break 
through to the embankment with his staff.
In the meantime the Regimental Commander, 
Colonel von Behr, with his reserve of the 8th 
Company and the rest of the Infantry Pioneer 
Company, took up an absorbing position south of 
Vimy. Here the onslaught was resisted for hours, 
until the heroic death of the leader of the 8th 
Company, Lieutenant von Rohrscheidt, and many 
other courageous fighters of a unit weakened to 
its limits. The remaining fighters together with a 
Deputy Officer and his five men withdrew to the 
rail embankment south of the road underpass 
Vimy-Acheville where reinforcements had arrived. 
In the meantime little pockets of resistance had 
stood firm and only after a long fight were taken 
by the English. In the “Felsenkeller” Captains 
Gueinzius and Schmidt-Eberstein with the 
Staff of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions put up a 
desperate fight in the hope of being relieved by a 
counterattack. The staff of the 2nd Battalion had 
been relieved in the morning and was held up 
by a gas alarm and the latest incoming barrage. 
One man after another fell or was rendered unfit 
for combat and one machine gun after another 
was destroyed. In the face of  an overwhelming 
grenade attack, the last defenders were pushed 
into the “Felsenkeller,” where the fighting 
continued for the only undestroyed entrance. 
Two soldiers with rifles and hand-grenades 
held a fearless guard. A waiting comrade would 
immediately replace whichever entrance guard 
fell or was wounded. But the numbers that were 
still able to fight continued to dwindle. After two 
men at the entrance simultaneously fell and their 
replacements were slow to react, the attackers 
got lucky and forced their way in. However, 
the invaders were thrown out in an energetic 
hand-grenade attack by Captains Gueinzius and 
Schmidt-Eberstein. Thus the fight continued 
for hours, although many of the injured lying 
in the basement were threatened by suffocation 
caused by poisonous smoke grenades, which 
were thrown down an air vent by the English. 
Only towards 1130 hours, when the last German 
grenade was thrown and every possibility of 
timely reinforcement had totally disappeared, 
did the rest of the defenders decide with heavy 
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hearts to surrender. After brave opposition, the 
resistance of Section Arnulf was overcome.
In Section Zollern, defended by the Reserve 
Infantry Regiment 262, the attack of the English 
through massive mine explosions extinguished 
the last lives there. At other points, the remaining 
resistance of the few surviving fighters lasted 
temporarily. Only in front of the third line were 
the charging attackers forced to halt. Already they 
withdrew from the murderous fire of the 262nd, 
as from the south came new groups of defenders to 
hold and counterattack. Lieutenant Niekutowski 
at the head of the 6th Company fell in defiant 
resistance with many brave grenadiers of the 
2nd Battalion. Also Lieutenant Wilcke was killed, 
next to him many brave Fusiliers. Small isolated 
pockets of resistance held out temporarily. Other 
battle groups broke out to bring news of the 
imminent loss of the first position. The leaders of 
the combat battalions - the Fusilier and 2nd - sent 
in their weak reserves, the 10th and parts of the 
7th Company, to counterattack. The leader of the 
Fusilier Battalion, Major Reschke, with his staff 
and a few Fusiliers, was soon in the fight. With the 
last remnants of his men – almost all wounded – 
he was captured after desperate resistance. The 
leadership of his orphaned Battalion was taken 
over by Lieutenant Baron von Richthofen. Further 
south the counterattacking riflemen – parts of the 
7th and 10th Companies – succeeded in fierce 
hand grenade combat to drive back the enemy 
some 100 metres and repelled his advance. 
Next to Captain Kroeber, the leader of the 2nd 
Battalion, his adjutant, Lieutenant Uhlhorn, was 
badly injured. He died of his wounds a few days 
later in a field hospital. From 2000 hours on the 
reserves of the regimental commander, Major 
Baron von Rotenhan, the 9th Company and the 
Machine Gun Reserve from Drocourt, arrived and 
A Canadian officer explores a battered German shelter in Farbus Wood, April 1917. A network of German gun 
emplacements and underground shelters were concealed in the wood. 
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in a bloody engagement consolidated the position, 
so that the eastern slope of the ridge would be 
held. Directly in front of the Riflemen rose the 
ruins of the small palace of la Folie.
Lieutenant Kopka, who, with the 2nd Machine Gun 
Company of the 261st Regiment was stationed in 
Vimy as a brigade reserve, put themselves at the 
disposition of the 262nd Regiment, and in the 
biggest danger. Kopka was shot in the head in 
the forward line. The constantly endangered left 
wing of the Regiment swayed completely in the air. 
Through their tenacious will, the steadfast 262nd 
succeeded in defiantly maintaining it against all 
the onslaughts.
On the right wing of the Division, the 261st Reserve 
Infantry Regiment held firmly. The clattering fire 
of the few undestroyed machine guns came out of 
the trenches and craters and the riflemen wildly, 
some standing, shot at the enemy. The bloody 
attack broke down in front of the Regiment. But 
strong danger threatened on the wings. From 
Section Zollern blazed a flood from the south 
towards the left wing of the Fusilier Battalion, 
which threatened to roll it up in the back. The 
battalion commander, Major von Knobelsdorff 
sent forward his reserves, the 10th and parts of 
the 12th Companies, in a powerful counterattack. 
They sealed off the enemy breakthrough 
towards the south with heavy losses. Lieutenant 
Koschmieder was hit by a deadly shot, as he 
brought a machine gun into position. Next to 
him many brave riflemen coloured the ground 
with their blood. However, the few remaining 
combat-ready officers, NCOs and fusiliers held 
the newly-won position tenaciously. Captured 
Lewis guns strengthened their fire power. Also in 
the north, after the explosion of powerful mines, 
the enemy penetrated Section Doberitz, which 
neighboured on the right, and with strong forces 
swung to the south, threatening encirclement. 
The right wing of the 1st Battalion stood for hours 
in bitter close combat against ever-new arms. 
Lieutenant Klabisch fell doing this in the middle 
of his faithful followers. A counterattack launched 
by the Battalion leader, Captain Zickner with his 
reserves of the 2nd and 4th Companies, drove 
the English back in a bloody struggle. However, 
the success was bought dearly. The brave leader 
of the 4th Company, Lieutenant Retzlick, and his 
platoon leader Lieutenant Lehmann, with many 
Grenadiers sealed their loyalty with their deaths.
Still the Regiment, with its middle – the remnants 
of the 3rd, 1st, 11th and 9th Companies – like 
a sandbar in the surging sea, securely held the 
forward trenches. But the continued attempts of 
the Canadians, with always-new forces, blasted 
the wedge of the 261st and the strength of the 
defender continued to fade away. An English 
grenadier group, whose grenades were flung 
30-35 metres, surrounded Lieutenant Balla, the 
commander of the 3rd Company in his crater; 
the grenades of the German grenadiers flew only 
15 metres. Their arms were paralysed! Only the 
fire of a rifleman, lying with an armoured shield 
in front of him, held the English back. He fired 
for hours and after every shot repeated the short 
exclamation “another one.” Close to Lieutenant 
Balla in this fight fell the brave Vice-Sergeant 
Stracke. Before midday an English airplane 
appeared, which wanted to finish off the men 
still fighting in the craters by bombing. In a lucky 
stroke the Germans fired white flares at it. The 
Englishman flew away without dropping his 
bombs. White flares today were the identification 
signal of his own troops for him.
In the afternoon reinforcements finally drew near. 
Lieutenant von Goerne sent two platoons from 
his last reserves, the 5th Company, to the Fusilier 
Battalion, where, with their help, the connection 
with the 262nd Regiment was secured. A short 
pause in the battle allowed the many lightly 
wounded to be sent back, and the badly wounded 
were brought to the bunkers. All hearts, however, 
were concerned with the anxious question, ‘where 
is the counterattack by the strong reserves?’
During this battle the batteries of the Division 
maintained, with all their strength, their 
annihilating barrage until 1900 hours (some 
until 2030 hours) with heavy losses; however, for 
them the battle situation in the forward infantry 
lines stayed unclear, and they had to keep to their 
previous barrage fire zones. In Section Arnulf, 
the batteries deployed were pulled into the close 
combat.  Many of their gun positions were west 
of the embankment, and for some time they had 
to fend off close range infantry attacks through 
direct fire and with carbines and grenades. Under 
enemy infantry fire, the 3rd and 8th Batteries 
of the 63rd Regiment succeeded in bringing 
their pieces back into position again east of the 
embankment. The enemy had already worked 
their way to the wire entanglement of the firing 
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positions of the 1st and 6th Batteries of the 63rd 
Regiment, who had to destroy their pieces after 
the last shot left the barrels – an honourable 
loss! Also two F-H Batteries – 10th and 11th of 
the 10th Regiment – in the Section Zollern were 
attacked by enemy infantry, in close combat, 
however, they held their positions with their own 
infantry support.
Deployment of the Reserves
As the heavy barrage continued to roar in unsurpassed violence, the Brigade alerted 
the resting battalions. The Division immediately 
ordered the entire area to heightened combat 
readiness. The divisional reserves – 2nd 
Battalion, 261st (5th Company Regiment Reserve 
in the “Lower slope position”), 1st Battalion, 
262nd (2nd Company Regiment Reserve in and 
around Vimy) and the 2nd Battalion, 263rd 
(8th Company Regiment Reserve in Vimy, 
Staff and 5th Company had not yet pulled out 
of their previous front line positions) – were 
moved closer to the battle zone. While they were 
marching, news reached them that the enemy 
had broken through to the south adjoining the 
1st Bavarian Reserve Division and had taken the 
first position. Soon the reconnaissance of the 
Brigade and Division revealed that the enemy 
had also broken through on the left wing of the 
79th Reserve Division and was rolling up the 
position to the north. Also north of the Division 
was a supposedly successful breakthrough. The 
Brigade ordered the Battalions, the 2nd/261st 
under Captain von Goerne and the 2nd/263rd 
under Lieutenant Heinecke, to march to the 
embankment south of Vimy, with the instructions 
that their Machine Gun Companies should push 
ahead at a trot. The 2nd/262nd Battalion under 
Major von Block pulled back as Division Reserve 
to the crossroad network east of Vimy.
The first Machine Gun Company 261 arriving 
from the onrushing reserves was deployed at 
the embankment to strengthen the weak forces 
of the 263rd Regiment and was greeted joyfully. 
The totally exhausted 2nd Battalion of the 
263rd followed them with the 6th Company of 
the 261st and later a Company of the 262nd. 
The other parts of the Brigade Reserve, the 7th 
and 8th Companies of the 261st, as well as the 
2nd Machine Gun Company of the 263rd, were 
transferred by the Brigade to the 261st Regiment 
with the Order that the second position must 
be held under all circumstances and to make 
contact with the 262nd Regiment. (After the 
Radio and Light Signals that had been received 
indicated that the enemy was already in the flank 
and rear of the 262nd Regiment and a strong 
response was needed or the 262nd Regiment 
would not continue to exist.) The 2nd Machine 
Gun Company of the 261st, lying as the Brigade 
Reserve in Vimy, had independently placed itself, 
as already mentioned above, at the disposition 
of the 262nd Regiment. So at least the heavily 
engaged fighting troops were guaranteed the most 
urgent help. Unfortunately the weak reserves 
did not suffice for a swift counterattack to re-
establish the positions immediately.
Towards midday, High Command ordered the 
Division to retake the Third Line which had 
been lost.  Also, the imminent arrival of  two 
fresh battalions – the 1st/118th (56th Field 
Division) and the 3rd/34th Regiment (80th 
Reserve Division) was announced. General von 
Bacmeister, who in the meantime had gained 
a reasonably clear picture of the battlefield 
position,3 decided at this point to fill the wide 
gaping hole between the 262nd Regiment and 
the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division by retaking the 
Telegraph heights through a counterattack. To 
accomplish this, von Bacmeister gave the Brigade 
the 1st/118th and a Company of Machine Gun 
Section 20 for this purpose.
Since 1340 hours the Brigade staff was located 
on the crossroad network east of Vimy  To 
carry out the Brigade’s order, Major von Block 
appointed Lieutenant von Behr to lead the 
counterattack and allocated him the 1st/118th, 
the 1st/262nd (without two Companies) and a 
Company of Machine Gun Section 20.  Starting 
from the Foundry area (north of Vimy), the 
counterattack was to proceed forward along 
the Lens-Arras road and attack the Telegraph 
heights to join with the 262nd Regiment to the 
right. Lieutenant Heinecke with the forces of the 
263rd Regiment lying on the embankment were 
to advance against the Telegraph heights south 
of Vimy, to connect with the attack of von Block, 
and on the left keep in contact with the assault 
troops of the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division. The 
artillery prepared the counterattack by firing 
on the ridge north of Thélus. The attacking 
battalions met at 1600 hours on the ridge east 
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of Vimy, and in order to avoid the ever 
increasing English shellfire had to go 
over the shallow trenches. Only towards 
1800 hours did Major von Block’s 
troops stride through Vimy. After the 
expulsion of the Canadians from the 
ruins of the village in the late evening, 
darkness and snowstorms hindered 
a rapid continuation of the attack. 
The second position was reached 
and the right made contact with the 
left wing of the 262nd Regiment and 
supported itself on its left on the Forest 
of la Comte. The counterattack from 
the troops advancing on the left from 
the embankment made slow progress, 
and the shock troops of the 1st Bavarian 
Reserve Division were still a long way to 
the rear, advancing southward.  They 
stayed locked on the military route from 
Vimy to Farbus under heavy artillery 
fire, from where they were finally pulled 
back to the embankment by their 
Regimental commander. Overnight, in 
the midst of the snowstorms, all contact 
stopped. As the Brigade regrouped for 
battle the next day, the 3rd Battalion 
of the 34th Regiment (without two 
Companies) along with several machine 
guns transferred from the Division were 
put at the disposal of Lieutenant von 
Behr. This allowed the occupation of 
the south side of Vimy so that contact 
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Top right: German prisoners captured by 
Canadian forces during the Battle for Vimy 
Ridge. These men display an assortment of 
headgear, including soft field caps, knitted 
toques, M1916 steel helmets, and in at least one 
case, a Canadian trench helmet! The impact of 
the wartime ersatz economy is also evident, as 
some of the Germans wear puttees rather than 
the more expensive leather marching boots.
Centre: German prisoners are marched to the 
rear after being captured at Vimy Ridge, April 
1917. The prisoners are under guard of two 
mounted Canadian soldiers, and several local 
civilians have come out of their houses to catch 
a glimpse of the enemy.
Bottom right: German prisoners captured at 
Vimy are marched away from the battlefield 
under the watchful eyes of Allied soldiers and 
local children.
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could be established with Group von Block. In 
spite of great difficulties, such as heavy fire and 
gas attack from Vimy, this was carried out by the 
morning by the brave troops. However, there was 
still a wide, gaping hole to the left of the adjoining 
Division, which was not closed in the darkness. 
To deal with this, the Brigade transferred a 
Company of the 34th Regiment as well as two 
Pioneer Mining Companies of the 263rd Regiment 
from the newly-arrived reserves to strengthen 
their left wing.
Close of the First Great Day of Battle
At the fall of darkness on Vimy Ridge, the Canadians, deploying strong forces with 
renewed power, continueed their attack against 
the projecting wedge of the 261st Regiment.
A furious close-quarters battle erupted, in which 
many of the best fell. As the last grenades were 
thrown, and the last cartridges shot, the local 
commanders decided to pull back to the next 
position. However, hardly had the last fighters 
leapt out of the craters to reach their objective, 
when they were hit by the sudden fire of the 
English guns and were destroyed. Some were 
taken into English captivity. The fate of one 
valiant soldier captures the conclusion of the 
drama. After, with a heavy heart, he had given the 
order to pull back from the great self-sacrificing 
position, in the deepening darkness Lieutenant 
Balla fell into a large water filled shell crater. 
To save himself from drowning, he clung with 
his last strength to the side, incapable without 
outside help of freeing himself from the mud. In 
this position the completely exhausted man was 
found by the English and captured.
Only a few found their way back to bring news of 
the conclusion of the heroic battle.
Through the deployment of the last strength of 
the 261st Regiment, the intermediate position on 
the eastern slope of the ridge was held. The first 
relief was the full-strength 3rd Company of the 
18th Pioneer Battalion, which was sent in during 
the night by the Brigade.
On the front of the 262nd Regiment, the fierce 
battles continued in the night as well. An energetic 
advance by Lieutenant von Richthofen drove back 
the English, winning back ground. The battle 
raged especially violently on the left wing of the 
Regiment, until the danger of its encirclement was 
averted by the advance of Captain von Block. In 
the morning, the arrival of a Company of the 34th 
Reserve Infantry Regiment brought further relief.
The dwindling munitions in the battle front, 
such as grenades, flares and barbed wire were 
replenished during the night in the northern 
sector from the Betricourt Munitions Depot 
through the Embankment supply line; and in the 
southern section through trucks, which like the 
former, unloaded under fierce fire.
Like the infantry, who were struggling with 
all their strength, the artillery batteries of the 
Division also suffered heavy losses. On the 
evening of 9 April, only 17 artillery pieces from 
12 field batteries were still operational. Due to 
the combat situation, they were concentrated 
into two Groups; Group North under Major von 
Bressentin and Group South under Captain 
Doering. Three of the Batteries of the 63rd 
Regiment, which had been withdrawn from the 
battlefield to the west of the Embankment, went 
into position by the Brigade Command Post at 
the crossroads. The Division transferred the 
3rd Battery of the 25th Field Artillery to them. 
Major von Bressentin moved his command post 
on the embankment to the 2nd/63rd, where on 
the morning of 10 April the Staff of the 261st 
and 262nd Regiments followed him. Captain 
Doering went to the crossroads, where the staff of 
the 263rd Regiment and the heavy artillery were 
in close proximity. This allowed the Brigade4 to 
direct the infantry battle in direct contact with 
the artillery groups.
On the order of the Division, the English Battery 
positions by Neuville St. Vaast were hit with gas 
munitions and the villages of les Tilleuls, Thélus 
and Farbus as well as the streets leading to the 
German lines were subjected to heavy fire.
In the meantime, thanks to the heroic resistance 
of the fighting troops, the crisis of the battle 
was overcome. Already in the late evening two 
Battalions of the approaching 111th Field 
Division had arrived to occupy the third line by 
Acheville and Arleux. They were followed on 10 
April by the other units of this Division, which 
were available to the General Command, and 
pulled back to the third position in the Town 
Bivouac. In the early morning the 2nd Battalion 
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of the 73rd and the 3rd Battalion of the 164th 
were placed at the disposition of the 79th Reserve 
Division and immediately transferred to the 
Brigade, where they were eagerly awaited and 
arrived at the crossroads around 1000 hours. 
They were immediately sent forward, each with 
two Companies and several machine guns, to 
the reinforce the exhausted forward units. The 
Brigade kept as a Reserve half of the 3rd/164th, 
which together with eight machine guns were 
placed on stand-by for the protection of the left 
flank of the Division.
The Battle for the Newly-Won 
Defensive Front
After the breakthrough, the German battlefront now ran in a bend from the 
western edge of Givenchy over the eastern 
edge of Vimy Ridge, then south of Vimy to the 
Embankment, from there south of Bailleul 
curving to the east along the western edge of the 
towns Gavrelle–Monchy–Wancourt. On both sides 
of the Scarpe the urgent danger was overcome 
through the new deployment of old established 
Divisions. Fresh battalions and batteries gave 
further support to the overall defence by the 
occupation of rear lines. So that on 10 April new 
attempts at a breakthrough by the enemy no 
longer posed a serious threat. In the afternoon an 
English attack using tanks in the Bailleul-Farbus 
sector fell apart under heavy defensive fire. A 
breakthrough attempt south of the Scarpe met 
a similar fate.
Towards evening brisk fighting raged on Vimy 
Ridge, whose eastern edge was temporarily 
lost  despite brave resistance. However, it was 
recaptured through an immediate counterattack. 
Overall, the dedication of the other divisional 
troops cannot be praised enough. Lieutenants 
Florenz and Schnioffsky from the 261st Regiment 
with many brave NCOs and men were killed. 
Lieutenant Wiese from the same Regiment was 
heavily wounded and taken into English captivity. 
He died from his wounds on 17 May.
A Canadian officer inspects the breech-block of 
German 21 cm howitzer that had been firing from a 
reverse slope position at Vimy Ridge.
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The Echelon Retirement of the 79th 
Reserve Division from the Battle
The Infantry of the 79th Reserve Division stood, for many days and nights, in snow, 
cold and mud, without enough sustenance and 
sleep, in the great battle. Their fighting strength 
was strained to the utmost and was soon 
completely exhausted. The General Command 
decided therefore, by relinquishing the still held 
eastern edge of Vimy Ridge, to pull back the 
remnants of the battalions of the 79th Reserve 
Division on the night of 11 April and to deploy 
more troops from the 111th Infantry Division 
in the Vimy position. Under the direction of the 
Brigade, the relief of the Infantry of the 79th 
Reserve Division was carried out after the arrival 
in the night of the 2nd Battalion of the 76th 
Regiment and Staff and the 2nd Battalion of 
the 164th. Before dawn on 11 April, with great 
difficulty, the sectors were newly remanned and 
the relieved Battalions pulled back. Only a weak 
force of the 262nd Regiment, which could not 
pull back before daylight, remained in Section 
Zollern on the eastern edge of the freshly snow 
covered Vimy Ridge. On 11 April they held their 
forward position, which was threatened from all 
sides, with the greatest dedication. Finally, after 
the long heroic battle, on the night of 12 April 
the last soldiers followed orders and cleared the 
blood-drenched ridge.
The battle line of the 79th Reserve Division now 
ran along the 2nd position, on the southwest 
corner of Vimy curving back to the Embankment. 
After the relief of its infantry, the Division 
Commander, the Brigade Commander and the 
Sector Commanders of the 79th Reserve Division 
retained command over their previous sectors 
and the newly-deployed troops of the 111th 
Field Division. On the night of 11 April with the 
surrender of Vimy Ridge, the last batteries west of 
the Embankment were pulled back. Some moved 
to the vicinity of the crossroads, while the rest 
took up new firing positions behind the 3rd line.
An English attack on 11 April against Vimy was 
broken up by the lively fire of our batteries. This 
artillery fire was used to disrupt the enemy’s 
advance, interdict the roads and hinder his 
observation from the ridge. On the evening of 11 
April, 22 field and 12 heavy guns fired in front 
of the 3rd line.
On this day the main attack of the English was 
launched along the Arras-Cambrai road. With 
overwhelming artillery fire and the deployment 
of large numbers of tanks, they occupied the 
village of Monchy.
The overall general situation had now developed, 
so that the Army Group decided, in order to 
achieve bearable conditions, to break off the 
defence of the enemy and to withdraw the forward 
fighting troops to the line Lens-Avion-Mericourt-
Acheville-Arleux-Oppy-Gavrelle. The guns of the 
artillery were withdrawn behind this line on the 
night of 12 April. However, the 79th Reserve 
Division still supplied the Infantry Brigade with 
two Field Batteries east of Vimy to support the 
nearby battle. As the morning of 13 April came, 
the withdrawing German positions were cleared 
from Lièvin over Vimy to Gavrelle. Only a weak 
rearguard stayed behind and it retreated at the 
first enemy pressure.
Command of the section of the 79th Reserve 
Division went over to the 111th Field Division. 
On 14 April the batteries of the 63rd Regiment 
were also pulled out of the battle.
* * * * *
The fierce battle for Vimy Ridge was fought to a standstill. To be able call oneself a “Vimy 
fighter,” was from then on a high honour!
With justice the Division Commander could 
extend his thanks and highest recognition in front 
of the assembled troops.
 But in the hearts of the fighters and their 
loved ones, who restlessly, with deep yearning 
lived through it all in the Homeland, the memory 
of the days of heroic glory and deepest sorrow 
glows indelibly at the Battle of Vimy Ridge, that 
patch of earth sanctified by the rivers of noble 
blood and uncountable heroic graves.
Notes
1. The Brigade Command Post was not completed by 9 
April , at the start of the battle, due to the shortage 
of manpower. The Brigade Commander and his staff 
therefore set up in the deserted shelter of an anti-aircraft 
platoon near the road network.
2. At the end of April 1917, the London News reported 
that in the 1st week of the Vimy offensive twice as much 
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artillery munitions were fired than in the first week of 
the Somme and in the second week of Vimy six and a 
half times as much as in the second week of the Somme.
3. At this place praise must go to the outstanding work 
of the Radio and Light signal stations, as much as the 
devotion of the brave messengers is stressed, who, even 
in the heaviest fire, kept safe the Battle orders. A Light 
signal station, which was built into the east slope of Vimy 
Ridge, still sent important messages until 11 April.
4. In a place of honour in my room hangs one of the 
masterly drawings from the, then freed, von Wiens, 
A Canadian soldier contemplates a German gun emplacement that
appears to have sustained a direct hit from Allied artillery fire.
depicting the 6th Company of the 261st Regiment on 
the Vimy Ridge on the night of 9/10 April. The picture 
conveys with vivid clarity, that which I saw, standing next 
to the battle position, in the same night: the ridge west 
of Vimy, the ruins of the village and the Embankment, 
half-left in front of him the Windmill, everywhere the 
activity of the fighting troops and the stretcher-bearers 
is lit up like lightning by the fire of exploding grenades 
and shrapnel.
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